# SPRINGFIELD PROCESSING PLANT\* (A HYPOTHETICAL FACILITY) SPP, ENTRY CONTROL POINT AND VEHICLE GATE ACCESS CONTROL POST ORDER

Note: This is a living document to be updated by Program Representative as necessary.



Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-ACO4-94AL85000.



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#### 1.0 PURPOSE

This *hypothetical* order provides the requirements and instructions for the Springfield Processing Plant (SPP) Vehicle Gate and Entry Control Point (ECP) in the perimeter access building.

The purpose of this post is to prevent the theft, sabotage or diversion of nuclear material (NM), control access and exit at the protected area, and to respond to emergencies according the SPP Guard Force (GF) Contingency Plan and as directed by a Guard Force Supervisor.

# 2.0 SCOPE

This order applies to SPP Guards staffing SPP main ECP Vehicle Gate post.

The scope of this post is to control access and exit to the protected area, respond to security and non-security emergencies, and conduct foot patrols during non-operational hours.

Post 2 is responsible for the following:

24 hour access and egress control of SSP main entrance.

- 1. Badge checking
- 2. Prohibited article screening
- 3. Vehicle access non work hours.
- 4. Emergency response access for external elements

Post 3 is responsible for the following:

Operational hours

- 1. Metal detection screening of personnel for prohibited articles.
- Access and egress support at SPP Vehicle Gate and ECP

Post 4 is responsible for the following:

- 1. Access and egress at SPP Vehicle Gate
- Vehicle inspection process on access and egress.
- Remaining in the hardened post unless processing vehicles or properly relieved.
- 4. Monitoring access and inspection functions of Post 1/Post 2.

#### 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS

#### 3.1 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

#### SPP Guard

- 1. Uncertain on post operations or concerns contact a Guard Force Supervisor for clarification.
- Uncertain of current response positions as identified in the current SPP Contingency Plan, Contact a Guard Force Supervisor for clarification.
- 3. Respond to all security incidents located in area of responsibility, or as directed by a Guard Force Supervisor.
- 4. Respond as directed by a CAS operator or a Guard Force Supervisor to all non-security incidents.

- 5. Report any post safety hazards or working conditions that may be detrimental to the Guard Force Supervisor.
- 6. Conduct a daily a daily start up procedure of inspection equipment.
- 7. Upon manning assigned post inspect the following:
  - a. Fences and gates looking for erosion and washouts two inches beneath the fence line.
  - b. Vehicle barriers.
  - c. Notify a Guard Force Supervisor of these deficiencies.
  - d. Standby until a compensatory measure is determined by a Guard Force Supervisor.
- 8. Report suspicious or unusual activity to a CAS operator and a Guard Force Supervisor.
- 9. Observe for unauthorized personnel.
  - a. If unauthorized personnel are observed, provide a CAS operator with the following:
    - location
    - direction of travel
    - pertinent vehicle information
    - · description of personnel
    - request backup

#### 3.2 NON-SECURITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE

- 1. Verify the emergency by contacting a Guard Force Supervisor.
- 2. Respond as directed by a CAS operator and a Guard Force Supervisor to all non-security emergencies.
- 3. Allow persons access or exit according to the procedures in this document or as directed by a Guard Force Supervisor.

#### 3.3 SECURITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE

1. Respond to all security alarms and emergencies located in area of responsibility according to the SPP CONTINGENCY PLAN, or as directed by a Guard Force Supervisor.

# 3.4 IN-BOUND PROCESSING OF PERSONS

# 3.4.1 SPP ECP

- 1. Perform entrance inspections of all personnel and hand-carried items to prevent the introduction of explosives, weapons, or other prohibited articles.
- 2. Physically inspect all items that appear to be suspicious and that may appear to present a potential threat; e.g., a large solid object that could hide items, firearms, compounds that may be explosive, wiring that could be used for a bomb, etc.
- 3. Conduct handheld metal inspections
- 4. If an item CANNOT be physically inspected:
  - a. Notify a Guard Force Supervisor.
  - b. Detain the individual.

c. Notify the person's supervisor upon the arrival of a Guard Force Supervisor.

# 3.4.2 OUT-BOUND PROCESSING OF PERSONS

**Note**: Persons exiting the protected area will process out from the area by using the badge reader on the access control system.

# 3.5 ECP POST SPECIFIC ACCESS REQUIREMENTS

#### 3.5.1 POST 2 PROCESS FOR BADGE AND PROHIBITED ARTICLE INSPECTIONS

# Conducting entry inspections

- 1. Obtain persons badge and verify that the badge is valid and it matches the person presenting it.
- 2. Direct the person to remove all metal and personal items from their person and place items into the inspection tray.
- 3. Inspect the items for prohibited articles.
- 4. In addition inspect all hand carried items for prohibited articles.
- 5. If prohibited articles are discovered deny access, document the person's name and items found and contact the Guard Force Supervisor
- 6. If no prohibited articles are found, return the badge to the person and direct them to the metal detection inspection area.
- 7. Observes personnel for unusual behavior

# 3.5.2 POST 3 ENTRY PROCESS FOR METAL DETECTION INSPECTIONS FOR PROHIBITED ARTICLES

- 1. Direct the person to the inspection area.
- 2. Ask if they have any personal items on their person.
- 3. Conduct the metal detection inspection.
- 4. If the metal detector alarms identify the cause of the alarm.
- 5. If the cause of the alarm cannot be determined deny access and contact the Guard Force Supervisor.
- 6. Once the person has passed the inspection, direct personnel to the entry portal one at a time, swipe his or her badge, and enter a unique PIN.
- 7. Observes personnel for unusual behavior.

#### 3.5.3 POST 4 PROCESS FOR VEHICLE TRAP INSPECTIONS

- 1. Control traffic for inbound and outbound vehicles.
- When vehicles are **NOT** entering or exiting the SPP, ensure both gates of the vehicle trap are closed.
- 3. Ensure that all vehicles first stop outside of the vehicle trap.
- 4. IF the vehicle is suspicious or suspicious activity is observed, do not open the vehicle trap gate and contact a Guard Force Supervisor to help resolve any discrepancies.
- 5. Ensure that all passengers exit the vehicle, and enter the perimeter access building for access control processing.
- 6. Ensure that only one vehicle at a time enters the vehicle trap.

- 7. Allow the vehicle in the vehicle trap area and close the gate behind them.
- 8. Obtain the drivers badge and retain until the inspection is completed.
- 9. Verify the persons badge for authorized access.
- 10. Direct the driver to put the vehicle in park, turn off the vehicle and set the parking break.
- 11. Direct the driver to open all compartments inside and outside the vehicle.
- 12. Have the driver remove all items from their person and place them in the inspection tray provided.
- 13. Inspect for prohibited articles then conduct search of the person using the portable metal detector.
- 14. Direct the driver to stand in a location where the can be observed during the vehicle search.
- 15. Conduct the search of the vehicles to include all interior and exterior compartments. Use the search mirror and other equipment available for prohibited articles.
- 16. If the any suspicious activity is observed, or prohibited articles are found detain the driver notify the interior ECP post and contact a Guard Force Supervisor.
- 17. If no prohibited articles are identified return the drivers badge and allow access.
- 18. For **outbound searches** conduct them the same as inbound with the exception of inspection for Nuclear Material and facility property.
- 19. Searches of the following vehicles are not mandatory:
  - a. vehicles driven by State couriers
  - b. Clearly marked guard force vehicles driven by uniformed guard force personnel.
- 20. When on authorized business, and driven by, or under escort of, properly cleared and authorized personnel Allow access and egress to the following types of vehicles:
  - a. state
  - b. contractor
  - c. delivery
  - d. service

Note: Privately owned vehicles are not allowed in the SPP.

# SPRINGFIELD PROCESSING PLANT\* (A HYPOTHETICAL FACILITY) INTERIM STORAGE BUILDING ACCESS CONTROL POST ORDER

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#### 1.0 PURPOSE

This *hypothetical* order provides the requirements and instructions for Interim Storage Building (ISB) Post which is located in the Springfield Processing Plant (SPP) Interim Storage Building 78 (ISB).

The purpose of this post is to prevent the theft, sabotage or diversion of nuclear material (NM), control persons accessing and exiting the material access area, and to respond to emergencies according the SPP Contingency Plan and as directed by a Guard Force supervisor.

#### 2.0 SCOPE

This order applies to Guards staffing ISB Post 5

The scope of this post is to control access to the material access area, provide over-watch of Building 78 ISB Post, and respond to security emergencies.

#### 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS

#### 3.1 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

#### Guard:

- [1] If uncertain how to operate this post, or how to perform any procedure, contact a Guard Supervisor for clarification.
- [2] If uncertain of current response positions as identified in the current SPP Contingency Plan, contact a Guard Force Supervisor for clarification.
- [3] When a post is rendered out-of-service, secure the area and notify CAS the area is clear and alarm area.
- [4] Respond to all security incidents located in area of responsibility, or as directed by a Guard Force Supervisor.
- [5] Respond as directed by a Central Alarm Station (CAS) operator and a Guard Force Supervisor to all non-security incidents.
- [6] Report any post safety hazards or working conditions to Guard Force Supervisor.
- [7] Report suspicious or unusual activity to a CAS operator and a Guard Force Supervisor.
- [8] Observe for unauthorized personnel.
  - [A] IF unauthorized personnel are observed, contact CAS and provide the following:
    - location
    - direction of travel
    - pertinent vehicle information
    - description of personnel

AND request backup.

- [9] Document all security incidents and emergencies on a security incident report.
- [10] Follow instructions issued at muster.
- [11]Conduct a daily a daily start up procedure of inspection equipment.

#### 3.2 NON-SECURITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE

- [1] Verify the emergency by contacting a guard force supervisor.
- [2] Allow persons access or exit according to the procedures in this document **OR** as directed by a guard force supervisor.
- [3] IF a non-security emergency results in the evacuation of the SPP Interim Storage Building,
  - Once notified by the facility evacuation team that all personnel have exited the ISB relay to CAS all personnel have exited.
  - Exit the Post and set up a containment position with a visual on ISB emergency door 1 (west side)
  - Monitor the area until the emergency is cleared of directed by a guard force supervisor.

#### 3.3 SECURITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE

- [1] Respond to all security alarms and emergencies located in area of responsibility according to the Contingency Plan or as directed by a guard force supervisor.
- [2] Respond as directed by a CAS operator and a Guard Force Supervisor to all non-security emergencies.
- [3] Respond to security alarms.

#### 3.4 PERSONNEL ENTRY CONTROL AND INSPECTIONS

**Note**: The SPP Interim Storage Building is limited to authorized personnel on official business only. Questions or unresolved concerns regarding entry or exit from the SPP Interim Storage Building are directed to a Guard Force Supervisor before any action is taken.

**Note**: Entry into the SPP Interim Storage Building MAA is normally granted to operational personnel with exchange badges during normal working hours. Special access to the MAA during non-working hours must be coordinated with and approved by an SPP Guard Force Supervisor with approval from the operations personnel.

**Note**: The two person rule requires two authorized who are knowledgeable of the task being performed and have a need to know.

- [1] When the material is secured in the vaults and there is no "hands on" access to the material, the two person rule is NOT in effect.
- [2] When the vaults are open, and there is "hands on" access to the material, the two person rule is always in effect.
- [3] When the material leaves the vaults at any time, the two person rule is always in effect.

# **ISB Post 5 Entry Process**

- [1] Personnel will enter door #2 leading to the ISB utilizing their issued facility badge.
- [2] Direct the person through the portal metal detector prohibited article inspection screening.

- [A] Once they successfully pass through the portal metal detector have them proceed to the exchange window.
- [B] If the alarm sounds, have them check for metallic objects on their person and attempt to enter again.
- [C] If the source of the alarm cannot be identified, deny access and contact CAS who will dispatch a roving patrol to conduct a handheld metal inspection.
- [3] Perform a physical badge inspection.
- [4] Verify person(s) is listed on the SPP Interim Storage Building MAA access list and issue their exchange badge.
- [5] Retain their normal badge until the exchange badge has been retuned.
- [6] Allow person to proceed to door 3 leading to the MAA.
- [7] If a person is NOT on the SPP Interim Storage Building MAA access list or have a current exchange badge; **deny access**, and contact facility personnel for access approval.

## 3.5 PERSONNEL EXIT CONTROL AND INSPECTIONS

**Note**: Persons exiting the SPP Interim Storage Building MAA leave through Personnel Door 3. Before they open the Personnel Door 3, a person must ensure that Personnel Door 2 is closed.

#### **ISB Post 6 Exit Process**

- [1] If Personnel Door 3 is opened when Personnel Door 2 is open, immediately take action to close Personnel Door 3.
- [2] Retrieve persons exchange badge.
- [3] Verify persons on the SPP Interim Storage Building MAA access list or were authorized upon entrance.
- [4] Return the person's regular facility badge.
- [5] Direct the person to move through the portal NM detector.
  - [A] Once they successfully pass through the portal NM detector have them proceed out of door 2.
  - [B] If the alarm sounds have them step back inside the room and attempt to exit again.
  - [C] If the source of the alarm cannot be identified detain the individual deny exit and contact a CAS who will dispatch a roving patrol to conduct a handheld NM inspection.

## **ACRONYMS**

CAS	Central Alarm Station
SPP	Springfield Processing Plant
MAA	Material Access Area
NM	Nuclear material

# SPRINGFIELD PROCESSING PLANT\* (A HYPOTHETICAL FACILITY) PROCESSING FACILITY ACCESS CONTROL POST ORDER

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# 1.0 PURPOSE

This *hypothetical* order provides the requirements and instructions for Processing Facility (PF) Post 6 which is located in the Springfield Processing Plant (SPP) Processing Facility building 88 (PF).

The purpose of this post is to prevent the theft, sabotage or diversion of nuclear material (NM), control persons accessing and exiting the material access area, and to respond to emergencies according the SPP Contingency Plan and as directed by a Guard Force supervisor.

# 2.0 SCOPE

This order applies to Guards staffing PF Post 6

The scope of this post is to control access to the material access area, provide over-watch of Building 88 PF Post, and respond to security emergencies.

#### 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS

#### 3.1 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

- [1] If uncertain how to operate this post, or how to perform any procedure, contact a guard force supervisor for clarification.
- [2] If uncertain of current response positions as identified in the current SPP Contingency Plan, contact a guard force supervisor for clarification.
- [3] When a post is rendered out-of-service, secure the area and notify CAS the area is clear and alarm area.
- [4] Respond to all security incidents located in area of responsibility, or as directed by a guard force supervisor.
- [5] Respond as directed by a Central Alarm Station (CAS) operator and a guard force supervisor to all non-security incidents.
- [6] Report any post safety hazards or working conditions to guard force supervisor.
- [7] Report suspicious or unusual activity to a CAS operator and a guard force supervisor.
- [8] Observe for unauthorized personnel.
  - [A] If unauthorized personnel are observed, contact CAS and provide the following:
    - location
    - direction of travel
    - · pertinent vehicle information
    - description of personnel

#### AND request backup.

- [9] Document all security incidents and emergencies on a security incident report.
- [10]Follow instructions issued at muster.
- [11]Conduct a daily a daily start up procedure of inspection equipment.

#### 3.2 NON-SECURITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE

- [1] Verify the emergency by contacting a guard force supervisor.
- [2] Allow persons access or exit according to the procedures in this document, or as directed by a guard force supervisor.
- [3] If a non-security emergency results in the evacuation of the SPP Processing Facility:
  - [A] Direct all personnel exiting the facility to report to the emergency evacuation point.
  - [B] Once notified by the facility evacuation team that all personnel have exited the processing facility relay to CAS all personnel have exited.
  - [C] Exit the PF to your emergency evacuation point west of building 88 where you can maintain a visual on the west side of the PF door #1 and rollup door #1 until the emergency is clear of directed by a guard force supervisor.

# 3.3 SECURITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE

- [1] Respond to all security alarms and emergencies located in area of responsibility according to the Contingency Plan or as directed by a guard force supervisor.
- [2] Respond as directed by a CAS operator and a guard force supervisor to all non-security emergencies.
- [3] Respond to security alarms.

#### 3.4 PERSONNEL ENTRY CONTROL AND INSPECTIONS

**Note**: The SPP Processing Facility is limited to authorized personnel on official business only. Questions or unresolved concerns regarding entry or exit from the SPP Processing Facility are directed to a guard force supervisor before any action is taken.

**Note**: Entry into the SPP Processing Facility MAA is normally granted to operational personnel with special access during normal working hours. Special access to the MAA during non-working hours must be coordinated with and approved by an SPP guard force supervisor with approval from the operations personnel.

**Note**: The two person rule requires two authorized who are knowledgeable of the task being performed and have a need to know.

- [1] When the material is secured in the vaults and there is no "hands on" access to the material, the two person rule is NOT in effect.
- [2] When the vaults are open, and there is "hands on" access to the material, the two person rule is always in effect.
- [3] When the material leaves the vaults at any time, the two person rule is always in effect.

# **PF Post 6 Entry Process**

- [1] Personnel will enter personnel door #2 leading into the PF utilizing their issued facility badge.
- [2] Direct the person through the portal metal detector prohibited article inspection screening.
  - [A] Once they successfully pass through the portal metal detector allow access to the PF.

- [B] If the alarm sounds, have them check for metallic objects on their person and attempt to enter again.
- [C] If the source of the alarm cannot be identified, conduct a handheld metal inspection.
- [D] If the source of the alarm cannot be identified, deny access and detain the individual.
- [E] Contact CAS who will dispatch contact facility personnel and the guard force supervisor to help in resolving the cause of the alarm.
- [3] Perform a physical badge inspection.
- [4] If a person is NOT on the SPP Processing Facility MAA access list, **deny access**, and contact facility personnel for access approval.

# 3.5 PERSONNEL EXIT CONTROL ANDNM INSPECTIONS

#### PF Post 6 Exit Process

- [1] Persons exiting the SPP Processing Facility MAA leave through Personnel Door 3.
- [2] Direct all personnel to stop at the guard desk using the handheld NM detector perform a NM inspection.
- [3] Once they successfully pass the inspection allow egress from the PF.
- [4] If the monitor alarm sounds, attempt to monitor them again.
- [5] If the source of the alarm cannot be identified, deny egress and detain the individual.
- [6] Contact CAS who will dispatch contact facility personnel and the guard force supervisor to help in resolving the cause of the alarm.

#### PF Post 6 Material Transfer Process

- [1] When facility personnel request to transfer material out of the PF ensure the following;
  - [A] All material canisters items must have a TID unless open and empty.
  - [B] Verify the TID on all items to the transfer paperwork.
  - [C] If differences are identified do not let the transfer proceed.
  - [D] Contact the CAS and the Guard Force Supervisor and inform them of the anomaly.
  - [E] Detain the individual (s) until resolution is confirmed.

# **ACRONYMS**

CAS	Central Alarm Station
SPP	Springfield Processing Plant
MAA	Material Access Area
NM	Nuclear material
PF	Processing Facility